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HOW DRAMATIC SHIFTS IN
PERCEPTIONS OF PARENTING HAVE
EXPOSED FAMILIES, FREE-RANGE OR
OTHERWISE, TO STATE INTERVENTION:
A COMMON LAW TORT APPROACH TO
REDEFINING CHILD NEGLECT
DAVID MANNO*
Parenting norms have shifted dramatically in recent years, favoring
overprotection over traditional notions of childhood independence. This shift
has permeated vague and overbroad legal standards governing child neglect,
allowing parents to be held civilly and criminally liable despite the absence of
harm to their children. Indeed, parents who allow their children to remain
unsupervised, whether as a lesson in independence or not, are at risk of
removal based on subjective decision making processes that largely favor
overprotection. Because this shift conflates neglect with non-conformity, those
who favor traditional notions of child-rearing are unlikely to implement their
own parenting style out offear of intervention.
Despite the increased risk of removal, the Fourteenth Amendment presumes
parents fit and protects their interest in raising their children. With this
constitutional precept in mind, legislatures should incorporate a more objective
framework into child neglect statutes. Adopting a hybrid economic and
foreseeability tort structure to balance against contextual aggravating or
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mitigating factors will help elucidate a fairer framework that will limit
discretion and promote uniform enforcement of child neglect laws.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental right guaranteed by our Constitution is the right
for parents to raise their children as they see fit without state
intervention.' However, parenting standards in the United States
have shifted dramatically in recent years, favoring overprotection and
constant supervision over the imagination, exploration, and
independence parents have sought to instill in their children for
generations.! Indeed, "free-range" parenting, which aims, in part, to
promote independence and self-sufficiency in children, defined the
parent-child relationship for generations.' Recently, however,
"helicopter parenting" has gained prominence and has become the
most widely practiced parenting method over the past fifteen years.4
Helicopter parents are described as overprotective parents that watch
their child's every move, "hover [ing] over [him or her] like a
helicopter."' There is no consensus as to what sparked the shift to
overprotection; however, the advent of wireless communication and the
internet,' competition,' and parents' own childhood experiences' have
1. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000) (declaring a Washington
state statute unconstitutional because it infringed on the fundamental parental right
"to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children").
2. See Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA.
L. REv. 533, 574 (2013) (noting that, while "hovering parents" are not a new
phenomenon, until the nineteenth century, most American children were left
unattended or expected to work, which fostered self-reliance in children that carried
through the generations).
3. See, e.g., What Kind of Parent Are You? The Debate Over 'Free Range' Parenting,
NPR (Apr. 26, 2015, 9:21 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/26/402226053/what-
kind-of-parent-are-you-the-debate-over-free-range-parenting (describing the Meitivs
as parents that "want to instill self-reliance and independence in their children").
4. For an analysis of the social and technological trends surrounding helicopter
parenting, see generally Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1221, 1223-31 (2011) (discussing the shift in attitudes that resulted in "Intensive
Parenting" (helicopter parenting) becoming the predominant standard of care in
the United States).
5. HAIM G. GINoTr, BETWEEN PARENT & TEENAGER 18 (1969).
6. See Bernstein & Triger, supra note 4, at 1238-39 (discussing how cellular
technology has contributed to the emergence of helicopter parenting); see also Sarah
Briggs, Confessions of a "Helicopter Parent", EXPERIENCE, https://www.experience.com/
alumnus/channel?channeLid=parents-survival-guide&page-id=helicopter_parents (last
visited Mar. 27, 2016) (referring to cell phones as "the world's longest umbilical cord").
7. SeeJosh Levs, Whatever Happened to 'Go Outside and Play'?, CNN (Mar. 22, 2013,
12:16 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/22/living/let-children-play-outside
(emphasizing that "parental competition" has caused parents to constantly supervise
and schedule activities for their children, and that children today are deprived of
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likely contributed to the helicopter parenting trend. Because many
believe that helicopter parenting is the only proper parenting style, the
trend has effectively become "mandatory in many communities."'
This Comment argues that current parenting standards in the
United States emphasize overprotecting children instead of
traditional notions of parenting that allowed children more freedom
and independence. The shift to overprotection has permeated legal
standards governing child abuse and neglect and has led to
discrimination against parents of wide-ranging backgrounds. Indeed,
Lenore Skenazy in New York and Danielle and Alexander Meitiv in
Maryland are at risk of having their children removed by the state
because they allow their children to remain unsupervised in public as
a lesson in independence and self-sufficiency."o The Meitiv case
exemplifies that "free-range" parents may be guilty of child neglect,
even if their parenting philosophy does not expose their children to
any risk of harm. Moreover, child neglect statutes and the best
interest of the child standard, which govern all custody
determinations, discriminate against the economically
disadvantaged," those with disabilities," and, historically, same-sex
opportunities for "freedom and character-building," to which many children of past
generations were accustomed).
8. See Elisabeth Fairfield Stokes, I Am a Helicopter Parent-And I Don't Apologize,
TIME (Oct. 21, 2014), http://time.com/3528619/in-defense-of-helicopter-parents
(discussing the ways modern helicopter parenting attitudes may be influenced by
baby boomers' own childhood experiences); see also Briggs, supra note 6 (same).
9. Bernstein & Triger, supra note 4, at 1262-63; see Briggs, supra note 6
(expressing skepticism about a child's long term prospects if parents do not adhere
to the helicopter standard).
10. See infra Section I.A.5 (describing the effect of helicopter parenting attitudes
on parents who decide to adopt a more hands off approach to parenting).
11. See Allyson B. Levine, Comment, Failing to Speak for Itself The Res Ipsa Loquitur
Presumption ofParental Culpability and Its Greater Consequences, 57 BuFF. L. REv. 587, 606
(2009) (arguing that parents with greater financial assets have an advantage in
rebutting a finding of neglect because they have access to qualified lawyers and
medical care, while less affluent families, particularly those without health insurance,
simply do not have the resources to effectively represent their case).
12. See Rodriguez v. Dumpson, 52 A.D.2d 299, 300-01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(concerning a blind mother who vehemently fought to regain custody of her son
when a family court dismissed her appeal because the court stated her blindness
affected her ability to care for her son); see also Emily A. Benfer, Health justice: A
Framework (and Call to Action) for the Elimination of Health Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 AM.
U. L. REv. 275, 320 (2015) (describing the story of Erikajohnson and Blake Sinnett, who
lost custody of their newborn baby for two months because they were blind).
678 [Vol. 65:675
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couples.13  Consequently, parents that do not adhere to the new
standard of care are now at greater risk of having their children
removed by the state. Child neglect statutes should incorporate more
objective criteria to better recognize and evaluate risk perception,
risk assessment, and parenting decisions.
Part I of this Comment examines the evolution of child neglect
laws in the United States, focusing on modern child neglect laws and
the best interest of the child standard. Part I also introduces the
negligence standard of care in tort law, which provides a more
objective standard for child abuse and neglect law enforcement.
Part II argues that child neglect statutes and the best interest of the
child standard are vague, overbroad, and subjective and have led to
an increase in cases involving child abuse and neglect, despite the
absence of harm to children.
Part III recommends that child neglect statutes be reevaluated
through the lens of the negligence and causation standard of care in
tort law, which would provide a more objective assessment of suspected
cases of child neglect, resulting in uniform law enforcement.
Finally, this Comment concludes that redrafting child neglect
statutes to recognize risk perception, the social utility of diverging
parenting philosophies, and parents' deference in child-rearing
decisions will allow for a fairer and more balanced approach than the
current standard.
I. A DEVOLVING STANDARD OF CARE
Despite constitutional protections to parents' interest in raising
their children, the convergence of shifting parenting philosophies
that emphasize overprotection with insufficient statutory definitions
of child neglect-which results in wholly subjective assessments of
parenting-has led to increased neglect determinations notwithstanding
the absence of harm to children. The negligence standard of care in
13. Cf Danielle Epstein & Lena Mukherjee, Constitutional Analysis of the Barriers
Same-Sex Couples Face in Their Quest to Become a Family Unit, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 782, 811 (1997) (stating that the denial of "financial and societal
benefits ... linked [to] the right to marry ... undermines the policy of promoting
the best interests of the children"). But see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2604-05 (2015) (extending the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples); In
re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 551, 553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1993) (stating that adoption can provide "protections for [a child's] safety[,] ...
physical and emotional well being[, and] economic security," and that "the rights of
parents cannot be denied, limited, or abridged on the basis of sexual orientation").
2016] 679
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tort law can provide guidance on how to more effectively evaluate
parenting decisions that do not place children at risk of harm.
A. The Evolution of Child Neglect Laws and Its Effect on Families
Parenting in the United States has changed dramatically over the
past fifteen years. While the courts have traditionally afforded
parents deference regarding child-rearing decisions," modern
parenting trends have alienated some families," while others enjoy
the benefits of the protection of the law. Indeed, this shift in the
perception of what constitutes adequate parenting, along with poorly
drafted statutes, has led to discrimination against certain families,
with law enforcement officials determining custody based on their
own views instead of whether a parenting practice is lawful."
1. The constitutional liberty afforded to parents
Although shifting parenting standards and Congress's difficulty in
properly defining child abuse and neglect have recently dictated how
parents should raise their children, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects parents' interest in raising their
children without unjustified interference." The U.S. Supreme Court
has historically recognized that, in the absence of a familial dispute,
parents should enjoy the "freedom of personal choice in matters of
family life [as] a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."" It has equally been recognized that the
courts should not interfere with parental responsibilities as parents
are compelled to shape their child's world view and prepare him or
her for the future," which is an important lesson in maturity that
many parents hope to impart on their children.
14. See infra Section I.A.1 (describing the constitutional foundation of parents'
interest in raising their children without undue interference).
15. See infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text (providing introductions to the
Skenazy, Meitiv, and Harrell cases).
16. See infra Sections I.A.5, II.B (discussing the Meitiv and Harrell cases, and the
Maryland statutes and procedures used in Meitiv investigation).
17. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (extending due process constitutional guarantees
to protect natural families that the state attempts to break up without a showing of
parental unfitness).
18. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
19. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
680 [Vol. 65:675
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Supreme Court jurisprudence established fundamental protections
for parents. The Court, in Meyer v. Nebraska,2 o affirmed parents'
fundamental right to make child-rearing decisions. The Court
overturned the conviction of a schoolteacher who taught German to
a student who had not passed the eighth grade in violation of a state
statute. The Court found that the statute was arbitrarily applied and
did not relate to any purpose that a state may permissibly regulate."
Most importantly, the Court noted that because the parents had
consented and education was a fundamental liberty warranting
protection, the conviction could not stand.23 The Court determined
that the parents had the fundamental right to allow their daughter to
pursue an education as they saw fit and concluded that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
to . .. acquire useful knowledge, to. . . establish a home and bring up
children, . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential . . . .
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters," the Court reaffirmed its
decision in Meyer by invalidating a statute that made it a criminal
offense to prevent children between the ages of eight and sixteen
from attending public school.26 The Court held that parents'
fundamental right to raise their children extended to education
because parents who have the right to "direct [their child's] destiny
[also] have the right. . . to. . . prepare him for additional
obligations."2  In Wisconsin v. Yoder," the Court found that
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the Amish community, which rejects
high school education because the school programs sharply conflict
with Amish values.29 Chief Justice Burger, in affirming the value of
parental discretion in raising their children, held that there was "no
basis for assuming that ... reasonable standards cannot be
20. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
21. Id. at 396, 402-03.
22. Id. at 403,
23. Id. at 400, 403.
24. Id. at 399.
25. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
26. Id. at 530, 534-35.
27. Id. at 535.
28. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
29. Id. at 217.
2016] 681
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established concerning the content of the continuing vocational
education of Amish children under parental guidance. . . ."so
Finally, in Troxel v. Granville," the Supreme Court denied visitation
rights to a child's grandparents-rights that the custodial parent had
objected to in lower courts-because the fundamental right to raise a
child belongs solely to the child's parents." The Court found that
the state visitation statute" allowed any person to petition the court
for visitation of a child at any time, which could be granted if it served
the best interest of the child." The Court ruled that the visitation
order imposed by the lower court" failed to afford the mother any
deference and unconstitutionally infringed on her right to make
child-rearing decisions.
2. The erosion of the parental immunity doctrine
The erosion of the parental immunity doctrine has quickened as a
result of the shift in parenting standards. Initially expressed in the
late nineteenth century decision Hewellete v. George, 7  parental
immunity is a common law doctrine that refers to the axiom that
children cannot sue their parents, and vice versa, for tort claims.38
The courts believed that state criminal laws offered sufficient
protection from parental violence and that the courts would not
address civil sanctions.3" The parental immunity doctrine
30. Id. at 236.
31. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
32. - Id. at 72, 75.
33. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 2005 & Supp. 2014).
34. Troxe4 530 U.S. at 67.
35. See In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (discussing the
temporary order from the lower court that allowed the mother's former boyfriend,
who was not related to the child, visitation every other weekend).
36. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a
State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child-rearing decisions
simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made.").
37. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). In Hewellette, the Supreme Court of Mississippi introduced
the first parental immunity rule, which forbade a child from asserting "a claim to civil
redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent." Id. at 887.
38. See WILUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 905-06 (1941)
("American courts have refused to allow actions between parent and minor child for personal
torts, whether they are intentional or negligent in character." (footnotes omitted)).
39. See id. at 906 (explaining that the parental immunity doctrine was based on
the belief that civil litigation would disrupt "domestic tranquility and parental
discipline"); see also Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255, 255-56 (Iowa 1983)
(immunizing a father from tort liability for negligent supervision when his son was
injured by a grain auger); Sanford v. Sanford, 290 A.2d 812, 813-14, 816 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1972) (preventing a child from suing his father for injuries sustained
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traditionally defined the parent-child relationship," but challenges to
and consequent exceptions from the doctrine for civil redress claims
have eroded its viability." Currently, there is confusion among
jurisdictions over when it is appropriate for courts to intervene in the
parent-child relationship. For example, parents have been immune
under the parental immunity doctrine for failing to teach a child how
to cross streets safely and use seat belts, while others who have taken
measures to protect their child from danger have been held liable.42
In such cases, courts have had difficulty defining the scope of the
parent-child relationship with regard to negligent supervision.
Some jurisdictions have upheld the common law,' while others have
during a car accident "because if there was a need for [the parental immunity
doctrine to change,] it was better accomplished by legislative enactment"); Cook v.
Cook, 124 S.W.2d 675, 676-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (preventing a child from suing
her mother for assault because "a person may be punished criminally for such
malicious assaults"), abrogated by Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991);
Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12, 12-13 (N.C. 1923) (preventing a child from suing her
father for injuries sustained during a car accident because "[t]he state, through
criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and
wrongdoing"). But see Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 788-89 (Wash. 1905) (extending
the parental immunity doctrine to civil causes of action for rape).
40. See Porter, supra note 2, at 539 (noting that the parental immunity doctrine
developed from traditional concepts of a hierarchical family, which continues to be
idealized both socially andjudicially).
41. See Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search ofJustification,
50 FORDHAM L. REv. 489, 496-98, 508-09 (1982) (arguing that social changes and
failed policy rationales have either narrowed or abrogated the parental immunity
doctrine). See generally Sandra L. Haley, The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine: Is It a
Defensible Defense?, 30 U. RiCH. L. REv. 575, 581-91 (1996) (detailing the history of the
parental immunity doctrine and tracking the exceptions to the doctrine, such as
personal injury resulting from automobile or common carrier accidents, negligent
child-rearing, negligent supervision, parental abandonment, reckless and intentional
acts, and prenatal injuries).
42. See Haley, supra note 41, at 590 (explaining that, while parents have been immune
from liability in cases where a child wandered away and was bitten by a dog, a parent could
be held liable if he notices a danger but is negligent in protecting against it).
43. See id. at 591-92 (discussing the differing results of cases concerning
negligent supervision-where parent defendants are often not held liable-and
negligent entrustment-where parents are responsible on the theory that the parent
has knowledge of the child's ability to cause harm with the entrusted item).
44. See Squeglia v. Squeglia, 661 A.2d 1007, 1009, 1013 (Conn. 1995) (affirming a
father's motion for summary judgment based on parental immunity against his four-
year-old son's strict liability suit for injuries sustained after being bitten by the family
dog); Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497, 502 (Wash. 2008) (en banc) (invoking the
parental immunity doctrine because its primary objective is to avoid any undue state
interference in exercising parental supervision and discretion, and expressly
rejecting a "reasonable parent" standard).
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narrowed or entirely abrogated the parental immunity doctrine.4 5
Commentators argue that the doctrine has broken down in the wake
of helicopter parenting, increasing the potential liability for parents and
discouraging other child-rearing practices46 despite the liberty interest
parents have in raising their children without undue interference. 7
3. Federal standards
While state agencies are the primary authority governing family
law, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act48 (CAPTA) in 1974 to provide federal funding to support the
operation of state agencies responsible for investigating allegations of
child abuse and neglect, such as Child Protective Services (CPS),"*
and created a federal definition of child abuse and neglect.o CAPTA
defined child abuse and neglect as the "physical or mental injury,
sexual abuse, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child under
the age of eighteen by a person who is responsible for the child's
welfare under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or
welfare is harmed or threatened.. . ."' The definition has been
amended several times, exemplifying the difficulty in defining child
abuse and neglect. 2  Furthermore, CAPTA created incentives for
45. See Bernstein & Triger, supra note 4, at 1250 nn.124-25 (listing various
jurisdictions that have abrogated the parental immunity doctrine).
46. See id. at 1244, 1250-51 (arguing that the constriction of the parental
immunity doctrine "is an important enabling structure" for incorporating helicopter
parenting practices and "creates potential for judgments discriminating against
parents whose conduct does not conform to prevailing community standards," which
discourages "novel child-rearing practices").
47. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68 (2000) (extending due process
protections to parents' child-rearing philosophies); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978) (recalling the instances in which the Supreme Court has recognized the
constitutional protections afforded to parents and children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972) (declaring parents' right to conceive and raise children an "essential" right).
48. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (2012)).
49. See Howard Davidson, Federal Law and State Intervention When Parents Fail: Has
National Guidance of Our Child Welfare System Been Successful?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 481, 485
(2008) ("[The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA)] established a
state grant program for 'developing, strengthening, and carrying out child abuse and
neglect prevention and treatment programs.'" (quoting Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2012)))).
50. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974).
51. Id.
52. See David Pimentel, Fearing the Bogeyman: How the Legal System's Overreaction to
Perceived Danger Threatens Families and Children, 42 PEPP. L. REv. 235, 243-45 (2015)
(describing the legislative history of the definition of child abuse and critiquing the
684 [Vol. 65:675
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states to conform to the standard and continue to report cases
because it provided state funding only if a state amended its child
abuse and neglect laws to meet the minimum federal standard."
Prior to 2010, the statute defined child abuse and neglect as "any
recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which
results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or
exploitation, or an act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk
of serious harm."" The purpose of revising the definition of child
abuse and neglect was to limit state and federal intervention to
legitimate instances of abuse." However, using the terms "serious"
and "imminent" without any guidance as to what constitutes such
harm allows the law to apply in a variety of contexts, whether or not
intervention is appropriate or warranted."
Although the 2010 amendment to CAPTA removed the definitions of
child abuse and neglect," the former federal definitions have been
incorporated into many state parental termination statutes." CAPTA
definition that existed until 2010, which led to an increase in reports of
unsubstantiated child neglect because it vaguely defined abuse and neglect using
terms such as "negligent treatment" or "maltreatment").
53. Id. at 243.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g (2006) (emphasis added) (this definition was removed in 2010).
55. See Pimentel, supra note 52, at 245 (stating that the vague definitions of child
abuse and neglect prompted the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
to revise the language "to limit abuse and neglect definitions to serious harm to a
child" (quoting S. REP. No. 104-17, at 15 (1995))).
56. See id. at 245-46 ("Although the Committee's report shows that the change in
definition was meant to curtail [Child Protective Services (CPS)] intervention by
limiting it to situations involving 'serious harm,' the latter phrase that refers to
'imminent risk' of such harm reopens the door to apply the standard to a wide range
of circumstances.").
57. 42 U.S.C. § 510 6g (2012).
58. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-3(2) (ii) (West 2007) (defining an
abused minor as an individual who is under eighteen whose parent "creates a
substantial risk of physical injury"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4002(1) (Supp.
2014) (defining both abuse and neglect as "a threat to a child's health or welfare");
MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 5-701(b) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2015) (defining child
abuse in terms of whether the child is placed at "substantial risk of being harmed");
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.622(j) (ii) (West Supp. 2015) (defining child neglect as
parental conduct that places a child "at an unreasonable risk to the child's health or
welfare"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(XIX) (b) (Supp. 2014) (defining a
neglected child as one "[w]ho is without proper parental care or control ... when it
is established that his health has suffered or is very likely to suffer serious
impairment"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(A) (Supp. 2015) (defining child abuse
and neglect as conduct that subjects a child to "serious injury to the life or health of
[the] child"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(16) (West 2015) (defining
negligent treatment as an act or failure to act that manifests "a serious disregard of
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEw
requires that all individuals who report suspected child abuse or neglect in
good faith are immune from liability," which most states now follow."I
A number of states have also imposed criminal penalties for failure
to report suspected child abuse by imposing fines or threatening
incarceration.' When mandatory reporting laws were first adopted,
lawmakers believed that instances of child abuse "numbered in the
hundreds and therefore the governmental services in place could
adequately deal with the reports being filed."" With recent victim
rates in the hundreds of thousands," however, this belief in the
adequacy of governmental services is misplaced as CPS agencies
generally lack the resources to handle so many reports.'
4. State standards-the best interest of the child
In all child custody determinations, including termination of
parental rights in instances of abuse or neglect, the governing
standard is the child's best interest, which serves as the guiding
principle in placement decisions." Since the late-nineteenth century,
state courts have adopted "universal laws regarding the family. . . one
of those being the best interests of the child standard,""6 which courts
use to balance "(1) the parent's interest for family integrity; (2) the
state's interest to protect the minor; and (3) the child's interest in
consequences of such magnitude as to constitute a clear and present danger to a
child's health, welfare, or safety").
59. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (2) (B)(vii).
60. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse and
Society's Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 819, 860 (2010) (noting that, as of 2010, all
but two states grant immunity from civil or criminal sanctions to good faith reporters,
even if the report proves to be unfounded). The immunity from liability even
applied to reports made in bad faith until CAPTA was amended in 1996 to protect
only reports made in good faith. Pimentel, supra note 52, at 267 n.178.
61. See Hafemeister, supra note 60, at 863-64 (emphasizing the fact that many
states drafted statutes that encouraged apprehensive individuals to report suspected child
abuse or neglect by providing penalties such as a fine orjail sentence for failure to report).
62. Id. at 841.
63. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT ii, 20-21
(2013) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT] (reporting child abuse victim rates of
702,000 in 2009 and 679,000 in 2013).
64. See Hafemeister, supra note 60, at 829-30 (explaining that CPS receives
approximately 50,000 reports of child abuse or neglect every day, with each
investigative worker handling on average twenty-four cases, and up to as many as
forty or fifty cases, at one time).
65. SeeJoyce Koo Dalymple, Note, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using The Best Interest of the
Child Principle to Protect Unaccompanied Minors, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 131, 143 (2006).
66. Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child
Standard in American Juisprudence, 10J. L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 338 (2008).
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safety and a stable family environment."6 7  The courts determine
which interests prevail by examining the circumstances of each case
under the traditional presumption that, absent a finding of abuse or
neglect, parents act in their child's best interest. But investigations
for suspected abuse or neglect under state parental termination
statutes, particularly those involving children who were not harmed,
can undermine and intrude on the parent-child relationship.'
Since the development of the best interests of the child standard,70
children's rights have received more attention, culminating in the
"children's rights movement" of the 1960s, which ushered in a new
wave of judicial discretion in which judges largely ignored precedent
and sought to "probe tangled fact situations to discover the best
interests of an individual child."' Generally, the statutes simply
provided judges with a list of nondescript factors," giving them broad
discretion to enforce the best interest of the child standard in cases of
neglect. 3 Because child custody determinations focus on the child's
best interest without clear measures for such determinations, state
standards allow parents to be subjected to criminal punishment
without evidence of abuse or neglect.
5. The effect of child neglect standards on parents, free-range or otherwise
In 2008, Lenore Skenazy sparked national attention after she wrote
a short column in the New York Sun describing her decision to allow
her nine-year-old son to ride the New York City subway system
67. Darympie, supra note 65, at 143.
68. See id. at 143-44 (stating that "[o]nly when parents abuse their authority can
the state intervene to protect the child's welfare"); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
602 (1979) (recognizing the presumption that parents act in their child's best interests).
69. See Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1001-02 (1975) (suggesting that intervention
due to vague child neglect laws results in harm by erroneously removing children
from homes in which they were thriving).
70. See Kohm, supra note 66, at 339 n.6 (stating that the best interest of the child
standard originated in Lincoln v. Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1969)).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 372, 372-73 n.234 (stating that the core set of factors courts consider
in determining the child's best interests are "first, the opinion of the child and the
members of [his or her] family; second, the child's sense of time; third, the child's
need for continuity; and finally, the risk of harm to the child").
73. See id. at 373 (declaring that the "greatest concern with the best interests [of
the child] analysis lies with the judge who makes it" which allows for judicial
discretion that is difficult to harmonize with statutory law).
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alone.7 ' The media labeled her "America's Worst Mom," while many
parents accused her of child neglect.75  Ms. Skenazy subsequently
founded the movement "Free Range Kids," which aims to fight "the
belief that our children are in constant danger from creeps, kidnapping,
germs, grades, flashers, frustration, failure, baby snatchers, bugs, bullies,
men, sleepovers and/or the perils of a non-organic grape."76
Although Ms. Skenazy endured harsh criticism, other supporters of
the free-range movement have faced police intervention and possible
criminal charges. In late 2014, Maryland CPS visited the home of
Danielle and Alexander Meitiv after receiving a call that their two
children were unsupervised outdoors.77 The Meitiv children, ages ten
and six, were walking home after playing in a nearby park.7 ' Despite
there being no evidence of neglect or any risk of harm to their
children, CPS threatened to remove the children if the Meitivs did
not sign a form promising to supervise their children at all times until
a follow-up appointment." After an investigation, Maryland CPS
found the Meitivs guilty of unsubstantiated child neglect.so
In a second incident on April 12, 2015, the Meitiv children were
detained by police only three blocks from their home while walking
home from a playground and transported to CPS offices
74. See Lenore Skenazy, Why I Let My 9-Year-Old Ride the Subway Alone, N.Y. SUN
(Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.nysun.com/opinion/why-i-let-my-9-year-old-ride-subway-
alone/73976 (describing the careful planning and consideration that went into
Skenazy's decision).
75. Jane E. Brody, Parenting Advice From "America's Worst Mom", N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
19, 2015), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/advice-from-americas-worst-
mom (noting that Skenazy endured "damning criticism" and the threat of arrest for
child endangerment as a result of her column).
76. FREE-RANGE KIDS, http://www.freerangekids.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
77. See Andrew Metcalf, A Timeline of the Incidents Involving the Free-Range Meitiv
Kids in Montgomery County, BETHESDA MAG. (Apr. 15, 2015, 10:16 AM),
http://www.bethesdamagazine.com/Bethesda-Beat/2015/A-Timeline-of-the-
Incidents-Involving-the-Free-Range-Meitiv-Kids-in-Montgomery-County (providing a
timeline of the events surrounding the Meitiv case).
78. Id.
79. See Kelly Wallace, Maryland Family Under Investigation for Letting Their Kids Walk
Home Alone, CNN (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/20/living/
feat-md-free-range-parents-under-attack (stating that the CPS officer who arrived at the
Meitiv home claimed she had the right to take the children into custody immediately if
the Meitivs did not sign the form).
80. See Metcalf, supra note 77 (reporting that the Meitivs were found guilty of
unsubstantiated child neglect in February 2015, a charge which means that in their
case there was evidence of some child neglect but not enough evidence to
substantiate a definitive conclusion).
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approximately fifteen miles away.81 The case generated substantial
media attention and controversy because the Meitiv parents were
again found guilty of neglect despite the absence of clear evidence
that they violated state law and were not acting in the best interests of
their children." The Meitivs were under investigation for several
months, but were ultimately cleared of the first charge in May 2015,
and the second charge inJune 2015."
Although the Meitivs allowed their children to remain in public
unsupervised as a lesson in independence, parents who have no
choice but to allow their child to remain unsupervised in public have
been held liable for neglect notwithstanding the absence of harm to
the child. Such was the case for Debra Harrell, a working-class, single
mother, who was arrested and fired from her job after letting her
nine-year-old daughter play in a park unattended." At the time, Ms.
Harrell was an employee at McDonald's making minimum wage.
81. See id. The children were observed by police in the area of Fenton and Easley
streets in Silver Spring, Maryland and were transported to CPS offices at 1301 Piccard
Drive, Rockville, Maryland. Driving Directions from Fenton and Easley Streets, Silver
Spring, Md. to 1301 Piccard Drive, Rockville, Md., GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com (follow "Directions" hyperlink; then search starting point
field for "818 Easley Street, Silver Spring, Maryland" and search destination field for
"1301 Piccard Drive, Rockville, Maryland").
82. E.g., Bonnie Fuller, Free Range Parents Danielle and Alexander Meitiv Need to Stop
Fighting and Put Kids' Safety First, HUFFINGTON PosT (Apr. 15, 2015, 11:34 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bonnie-fuller/free-range-parents-danielle-and-
alexander-meitiv-need-to-stop-fighting-and-put-kids-safety-first b 7058238.html
(stating that "CPS should be concerned with parents who truly are neglectful or
abusive," unlike the Meitivs); Donna St. George, Montgomery Seeks Clarity Stemming
from 'Free-Range' Parenting Debate, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/montgomery-council-seeks-
clarity-stemming-from-free-range-debate/2015/04/22/a74fd86-e82e-11e4-9767-
6276fc9bOada_story.html (observing that Maryland law requires that children under
eight years old be accompanied by a reliable person over the age of thirteen in buildings,
vehicles, and enclosed spaces, but does not mention children playing outdoors).
83. Jessica Chasmar, Free-Range Meitiv Family Cleared of All Child-Neglect Allegations,
WASH. TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/
22/free-range-meitiv-family-cleared-of-all-child-negl; Maryland 'Free-Range'Family: 2nd
Neglect Case Cleared, NBC WASH. (June 22, 2015, 8:37 AM),
http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Maryland-Free-Range-Family2nd-
Neglect-Case-Cleared-309004351.html ("Officials [have not] commented but recently
clarified their policy, noting that the state [should not] investigate unless kids are
harmed or face substantial risk of harm.").
84. Bryce Covert, McDonald's Fires Mom Who Was Arrested for Letting 9-Year-Old Play
in Park Alone, THINKPROGRESS (July 22, 2014, 11:23 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/
economy/2014/07/22/3462704/debra-harrell-fired.
85. Id.
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Because of financial constraints, Ms. Harrell could not afford summer
school or childcare during her daughter's summer break." Instead,
her daughter spent the summer sitting in a booth at McDonald's
playing on Ms. Harrell's laptop.17 After her daughter asked to play in
a nearby park, Ms. Harrell allowed her to do so, requiring her to
carry a cell phone for emergencies.8 While at the park, Ms. Harrell's
daughter played with other children and could walk to her home or
to the McDonald's where Ms. Harrell worked in only a few minutes."
Furthermore, the park had a program that provided "free supervised
breakfast and lunches for children playing there.""
Ms. Harrell had no choice but to allow her daughter to be
unsupervised. Ms. Harrell was arrested, fired from her job, and
initially spent the night in jail." Even after she was released on bond,
the state maintained custody of her daughter for more than two
weeks." Ms. Harrell was only allowed back to work after her story
sparked national attention, and a crowd-funding site offered support
for her expenses and legal fees."
B. The Negligence Standard of Care in Torts
In tort law, negligence is based on the caution a reasonable person
of ordinary prudence would take," and there is only a duty to guard
against reasonably foreseeable risks." A person is negligent if he or
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Corey Adwar, Attorney: McDonald's Mom Who Let Her Child Play in Park Did Not
Put Her in Harm's Way, Bus. INSIDER (July 17, 2014, 1:31 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/attorney-defends-debra-harrell-after-daughter-
played-alone-at-park-2014-7.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Support Debra Harrell, YOUCARING, http://www.youcaring.com/help-a-
neighbor/support-debra-harrell/204837 (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
93. See Covert, supra note 84; Support Debra Harrell, supra note 92 (showing that
more than two thousand individuals supported Ms. Harrell, raising over $45,000).
94. Vaughan v. Menlove [1937] 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (PC) 492.
95. See, e.g., Lubitz v. Wells, 113 A.2d 147, 147 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955) (holding
that the risk of a significant injury after leaving a golf club lying in a backyard is not
reasonably foreseeable); Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. [1856] 156 Eng. Rep.
1047 (Ex.) 1049 (holding that there is no duty to guard against an unforeseeable or
remotely foreseeable risk or injury, and an individual cannot be negligent for
unforeseeable harm).
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she fails to "exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances."9 6
In evaluating whether conduct lacks reasonable care, the courts
consider several factors, including the "foreseeable likelihood that
the person's conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of
any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate
or reduce the risk of harm."97
1. Economic analyses of negligence
One way courts determine whether an act is negligent is through
applying an economic analysis test, which weighs the probability and
magnitude of harm, the cost of prevention, and the social utility of
the act as it stands. For example, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Co. v. Krayenbuhl,9" a four-year-old boy's foot was severed in
an unlocked railroad turntable.9" The railroad required its
employees to keep the turntable locked to prevent serious injury, but
employees regularly disregarded the rule.'o In a suit for negligent
maintenance of the turntable, the court employed an economic
analysis to determine what constitutes a negligent act and ruled that
the danger from using the turntable would be significantly lessened
by properly enforcing the rule to keep it locked.'01 In other words,
applying an economic analysis, the probability and magnitude of
harm to bystanders was high, the cost of prevention by locking the
turntable was low, and the social utility of an unlocked turntable was
low, but significantly higher if locked.1o2
2. Judge Cardozo'sforeseeability analysis in Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co.
A second way courts determine whether an act was negligent is
through a foreseeability analysis, which determines negligence based
on whether a risk is reasonably perceivable. In the seminal ruling in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,'03 Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
97. Id.
98. 91 N.W. 880 (Neb. 1902).
99. Id. at 881.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 882-83.
102. Id.
103. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). In Palsgraf the plaintiff was waiting on a train
station platform when a package of fireworks exploded. Id. at 99. Two guards were
simultaneously trying to help a passenger onto a moving train, and in the process,
the package in the passenger's hands fell onto the rails. Id. Unbeknownst to the
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stated that there was nothing that gave notice to railroad employees
that a nondescript package, which contained fireworks, was capable
of injuring someone at the other end of the platform, and that " [i] t
was not necessary that the defendant should have had notice of the
particular method in which an accident would occur, if the possibility
of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye."o10 While some
acts, such as shooting a gun, are so imminently dangerous as to impose a
heightened duty, a negligent act is "defined in terms of the natural or
probable" consequences."o' Ultimately, "[t]he risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation."106
In other words, because the act of knocking the package out of the
passenger's arms did not create any reasonably foreseeable harm, the
railroad company could not be liable for negligence.o10
II. INADEQUATE STATUTES LEAD TO IMBALANCED LAW ENFORCEMENT
Child neglect statutes of many states and the best interest of the
child standard do not provide guidance on enforcement,os allowing
law enforcement officials to abuse their discretion.' Although child
abuse and neglect laws aim to protect children, there may be an
increase in investigations-and criminal charges-of situations where
parents do not actually harm their children if child neglect statutes
are not revised to treat all parenting philosophies equally.
railroad employees, the package contained fireworks, which exploded, causing a
concussive blast throughout the station that injured the plaintiff when tiles at the
other end of the platform dislodged. Id.
104. Id. at 99-100 (quoting Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S. 150, 156 (1913)).
105. Id. at 101.
106. Id. at 100.
107. Id. at 101.
108. See infra notes 258-29 and accompanying text (describing the poorly drafted
child neglect statutes of California, Delaware, and Indiana, and the more objectively
based statute in effect in Illinois, to emphasize the vague language of the Delaware
and Indiana statutes).
109. See Kohm, supra note 66, at 353 ("The greatest concern with the use of [the
best interest of the child standard] today is that application of the doctrine rests on
the judge's personal observations and values."); Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the
Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child-Standard, judicial Discretion, and the American Law
Institute's "Approximation Rule", 41 U. BALT. L. REv. 83, 106 (2011) (stating that the
criticisms of the best interest of the child standard mainly involve the lack of
objective rules to help guide discretion); see also supra Section I.A.5 and infra Section
II.A (examining the Meitiv and Harrell cases where the Meitivs allowed their
children to remain unsupervised in public as a lesson in independence and
autonomy, while Ms. Harrell had no choice because her employment and financial
resources prevented her from securing child care).
692 [Vol. 65:675
REDEFINING CHILD NEGLECT
A. The Problem with Current Standards
State and federal child neglect statutes and the best interest of the
child standard are vague, overbroad, and subjective."o The current
system reinforces helicopter parenting and has discriminated against
families who, whether by choice or not, employ a more hands-off
approach to parenting."' As a result, children who are not actually
being mistreated are more likely now than ever to be victims of
removal. 1 2 The Meitiv and Harrell cases illustrate that parenting
practices that do not conform to the overprotective standard-
whether the parent disagrees with it or cannot adhere to it-will be
condemned, fined, and criminalized. The result, removing a parent
or child from the home, will inevitably threaten the parent-child
bond."' If the law is not changed in a way that promotes flexibility in
parenting styles, the Meitivs (and other free-range parents) and the
Harrells (and other economically disadvantaged families) will likely
have to adjust their parenting styles out of fear of intervention,
thereby preserving the shift to both child overprotection and the
legal system's response to non-conformity.
As previously discussed, children's rights and best interests have
received more attention in recent years, resulting in a turn "toward
new pure judicial discretion in contemporary judging, causing
litigators and advocates to have no rule of law to rely upon.""'
The permeation of helicopter parenting is unlikely to improve the
best interest of the child standard" because the standard neither
110. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the "best
interests of the child standard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively
encourage them to rely on their own personal values" and that several other courts
have "invalidate[d] parental termination statutes on vagueness grounds"). See
generally Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare
"Reform, " Family and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 688, 705-06 (1998) (arguing
that child neglect statutes do not explicitly impose particular standards of behavior
and fail to assist courts in making custody determinations).
111. See, e.g., supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (outlining the controversy
surrounding the Meitiv case where the Meitivs were subjected to police intervention
after allowing their children the freedom to walk to a nearby park alone).
112. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
113. See Wald, supra note 69, at 1001-02 (positing that erroneously removing a
child from a home in which he or she was thriving can cause harm to the child).
114. Kohm, supra note 66, at 339.
115. See Dalrympie, supra note 65, at 143-45 (discussing how the arbitrary nature
of the standard leaves judges to make custody decisions based on intuition under the
guise of the child's best interests); Warshak, supra note 109, at 104-05 (suggesting
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focuses on any particular factor nor identifies any characteristics to
help balance judicial enforcement, which perpetuates overprotective
norms. Indeed, the lack of guidance in applying the best interest of
the child standard may encourage parents to overprotect their
children because the standard influences law enforcement officials to
view parents not adhering to overprotective norms in a negative light,
thereby "undermin[ing] ... effective []parenting.""' The best
interest of the child standard will continue to depend on pure
judicial discretion unless additional key factors and elements are
provided for judges to consider.1 17
B. Intervention Based on Parental Conduct
Many parents have difficulty disputing a charge of child neglect as
statutory vagueness permits the state to intervene on the basis of the
parents' conduct, rather than harm to the child."'s While current
standards offer little to no guidance on the level of culpability
required to support a finding of neglect, leading to varied application
of law," 9 some courts are aware of the risks associated with the
problematic standard and have either repealed parental termination
statutes entirelyo2 0 or adopted tests to more accurately evaluate cases
under the relevant state statute to make custody determinations. 2 '
Still, child neglect statutes in other jurisdictions continue to
the subjective nature of the standard leaves judges susceptible to awarding custody
based on personal bias).
116. Warshak, supra note 109, at 104.
117. See Kohm, supra note 66, at 373 (arguing that unless the legislature or case
law provides additional factors to consider, judges' "decision making process [es will
be] relatively unbridled, and therefore thoroughly subjective").
118. See Wald, supra note 69, at 1000-02 (stating that child neglect statutes "almost
always define neglect primarily in terms of parental conduct or home conditions ...
[and neither] . . . require any showing of actual harm to a child ... [nor] specify the
types of harm that are of concern.... This encourages [law enforcement officials] to
focus on the parents rather than on the child ['s best interests]" (footnotes omitted)).
119. See infra Sections II.A-C, E (discussing problems with the current standards
that allow for significant law enforcement and judicial discretion).
120. See, e.g., Alsager v. Dist. Court of Polk Cty., 406 F. Supp. 10, 16, 21 (S.D. Iowa
1975) (holding that the Iowa parental termination rights statutes are unconstitutionally
vague because they inhibited a parent's constitutional right to child-rearing).
121. Davis v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Ark. 1979) (adopting a test to evaluate the
efficacy of vague parental termination statutes, which should allow for more flexibility
than criminal law statutes and less flexibility than statutes that regulate businesses).
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discriminate12 2 because of the shift to overprotection and its
affirmation by the courts."
Parents, such as the Meitivs in Maryland, are at greater risk of
losing their children even where there is no clear evidence of abuse
or neglect. The Maryland statute states that a child is any individual
under eighteen years of age,2 4 and defines neglect as:
the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper
care and attention to a child by any parent or other person who has
permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for
supervision of the child under circumstances that indicate: (1) the
child's health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk ofharm- or
(2) mental injury to the child or a substantial risk of mental injury.12 1
The statute is at odds with the practices of free-range parents and
others who leave their child unattended in public. Although the
statute states that a parent may be guilty of neglect if a child is left
unattended, it does not define any criteria as to what creates a
substantial risk of harm. More specifically, Maryland Statewide CPS
Screening Procedures, which have not been revised since 1996,
employ a broad, sweeping definition of an unattended child that is
unsuitable in a more modern, technologically advanced society that
helicopter parents openly endorse."' The procedure defines an
unattended child as:
[a child] who has been abandoned; a child less than [eight] years
old left alone in the care of either an unreliable person or
122. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (providing articles detailing the
Meitiv case and results from an investigation by Maryland CPS); see also supra notes
54-55 (indicating that vague terms have been incorporated into many state child
neglect statutes due to CAPTA incentives); infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text
(describing the Maryland child neglect statute); infra note 259 (describing child
neglect statutes that do not provide criteria to guide law enforcement officials as to
what constitutes neglect). But see 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3(1)(d) (West 2007)
(incorporating a list of factors to help law enforcement officials exercise their
discretion more effectively when making negligent supervision determinations).
123. See David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the "Free Range Kid": Is
Overprotective Parenting the New Standard of Care?, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947, 967 (arguing
that the trend toward overprotective parenting is reinforced by vague child abuse
and neglect statutes, resulting in overreliance on judicial discretion and inconsistent
application of law).
124. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 5-701(e) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2015).
125. Id. § 5-701(s)(1)-(2) (emphasis added); see also id. § 5-203(b)(1) (indicating
that parents "are jointly and severally responsible for the child's support, care,
nurture, welfare, and education").
126. See Bernstein & Triger, supra note 4, at 1236-41 (emphasizing that modem
technology allows parents to closely monitor their children).
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someone less than [thirteen] years old; a child between [eight] and
[twelve] left alone longer than briefly without sufficient contact or
safety information (phone numbers of parents, neighbors, etc.); a child
[twelve] years or older who is left alone for long periods or overnight
with responsibilities beyond his or her capacity or if the child has a
special mental or physical disability that creates a greater risk.127
Although the procedure seemingly provides guidance for state
officials to follow, simply listing ages at which children can be legally
left alone is not enough to limit discretion because it does not
account for the varying maturity levels of children. Parents, not law
enforcement officials, are in the best position to evaluate their child's
capabilities.1 2 1 Using the term "reliable" and the phrase
"responsibilities beyond his or her capacity" is a step toward applying
the law consistently, but finding parents guilty of neglect without any
knowledge of what support system is in place is insufficient because it
undermines parental discretion, the child's capabilities, or whether the
child seeks removal. Indeed, the procedure should focus more sharply
on factors indicating abandonment. Similar regulations may perpetuate
overprotective norms by continuing to criminalize parents who adhere
to more traditional or novel notions of parenting. More nuanced
guidelines that help state officials make a comprehensive assessment of a
child's circumstances could go a long way towards curtailing the
relatively unbridled discretion permitted under the current system.
Furthermore, the procedure does not account for any type of harm
that is reasonably likely to occur to an unattended child. Additional
guidelines providing a more comprehensive assessment of parenting
and its interaction with child neglect statutes will help promote a
uniform application of the law and decrease the number of
erroneous findings of neglect."'
Unless there is clear evidence of abuse, neglect, or a foreseeable
injury,130 the state should initially presume parents as fit.' 31 In tort
127. Frequently Discussed Topics, Ofce of the County Attorney, MONTGOMERY CoUNIY, MD.,
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/cat/services/fdthtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
128. See Pimentel, supra note 52, at 256 n.118 ("An outsider looking in may say
that a twelve-year-old is too young to babysit a younger sibling, but a fifteen-year-old
is mature enough. The ... parents, however, understand the child's true maturity
level the best; certainly some twelve-year-olds are up to the task, just as some fifteen-
year-olds are surely unfit for such responsibility.").
129. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3(1) (d) (West 2007) (providing fifteen
factors officials in Illinois are required to consider when making a determination of
negligent supervision).
130. Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502, 505 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that liability via
proximate causation may follow when an injury results from ignoring a standard of care).
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law, for example, an injured individual who seeks redress via a statute
must (1) be within the class of injuries the statute was designed to
protect; (2) be in the class of persons the statute was designed to
protect; and (3) have a causal connection to the injury.1 2  But
" [b] ecause [child neglect] statutes do not reflect a considered analysis
of what types of harm justify the risks of intervention, [decision making]
is left to the ad hoc analysis of social workers and judges" without
considering the decision's potentially broad effects."1s
To curtail the number of erroneous findings of neglect, child
abuse and neglect statutes should employ a more objective
framework, and consider "whether the parent is, or within a
reasonable time will be, able to care for the child in a way that does
not endanger the child's welfare.""' Additionally, parental decisions
should be assessed based on the facts and circumstances of each case
to appropriately serve the child's best interests."' Neither poor
judgment nor hands-off parenting should give rise to liability, or
worse, warrant the loss of a child if no injury is actual or apparent.
C. The Degeneration of Presumptive Fitness
The history of the presumption that parents are fit to raise their
children without undue interference can be traced back to the
Fourteenth Amendment."' This constitutional liberty affords parents
the freedom of choice in raising their children."' Indeed, many state
courts have established that, to protect parental rights, the trier of fact
must consider the best interests of the child and be mindful of the
presumption favoring a continuation of the parent-child relationship."
131. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (stating that even parental
conduct that "creates a basis for caution" should not overcome the presumption that
parents act in their child's best interest).
132. Trimarco, 436 N.E.2d at 505-06.
133. Wald, supra note 69, at 1001.
134. In reAdoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 937 A.2d 177, 191 (Md. 2007).
135. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 5-323(d) (LexisNexis 2012) (" [P]rimary
consideration [should be given] to the health and safety of the child and
consider[] ... all other factors [to] determine whether terminating a parent's rights
is in the child's best interests.").
136. See supra Section I.A.1 (describing several cases spanning nearly 100 years
where the Supreme Court has affirmed parents' fundamental right to raise their
children without undue interference).
137. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
138. See In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 937 A.2d at 192 (asserting that
the court's role is to carefully consider and make findings based on the relevant
statutory factors as to what constitutes the best interest of the child along with a
presumption favoring the parent-child relationship and articulate whether those
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But this presumption has broken down in the wake of
overprotective norms. For example, in the Meitiv case, unless the
children were placed in substantial risk of harm or the children were
incapable of walking home alone, there should be no presumption of
neglect."' However, the parents were initially found liable for
unsubstantiated child neglect,' and were given the option to either
sign a form promising to supervise their children at all times until a
follow-up appointment, or have their children removed
immediately."' A presumption of guilt might be justifiable in some
instances of clear abuse or neglect because such behavior is
universally condemned, but it is unjustifiable in the case of parenting
practices that do not expose children to either foreseeable or
unreasonable harm.' 4 2 Without the presumption of parental fitness,
parents will have difficulty making reasonable judgments based on
personal values out of fear of intervention, 14 thereby reinforcing
overprotective norms. Because overprotective norms have imbued
legal standards governing child abuse and neglect, 4 4 revising statutes
in terms of specific or reasonably foreseeable harm to the child will
findings clearly show parental unfitness or an "exceptional circumstance" that may
result in removal). But see In re Nathaniel A., 864 A.2d 1066, 1074 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2005)-(" [A] parent's right to direct his or her child's upbringing is not absolute.").
139. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-701(s) (1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp.
2015) (defining neglect); supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (explaining that
the Meitiv children were ten and six years old when walking one mile from a local
park to their home).
140. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
141. Wallace, supra note 79. Contra In re Yve S., 819 A.2d 1030, 1040-42 (Md.
2003) (stating that the protections guaranteed to parents in raising children are
contingent on satisfying the best interest of the child standard, which "embraces a
strong presumption that the child's best interests are served by maintaining parental
rights"); Pimentel, supra note 52, at 256 n.118 (noting that parents are the
individuals best fit to make determinations about their children's capabilities).
142. See Pimentel, supra note 52, at 276 ("[W]hen the problem is not actual harm
to a child but the mere possibility of harm-usually harm from some unknown, easy-
to-imagine, but most likely non-existent predator who might be out there-[a
presumption of guilt] is difficult to justify.").
143. See id. at 284-85 (stating that free-range parents will abandon their
personal parenting style and adopt an overprotective approach to parenting to
avoid CPS intervention).
144. Wald, supra note 69, at 1000-01 (commenting on the current standards for
intervention, which "allow virtually unlimited intervention").
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limit erroneous intervention and removal,145 and preserve parents'
interest in raising their children without undue interference. 1 46
D. Mandatory Reporting Negatively Affects Parents
In contrast to many jurisdictions, 4 1 only health care workers, law
enforcement, educators, and social service workers acting in a
professional capacity are required to report suspected cases of abuse
or neglect in South Carolina,148 while Maryland extends its similar law
to all state citizens."' In light of differing opinions as to what
constitutes proper parenting in a continually-evolving society, law
enforcement officials should investigate reports from bystanders with
skepticism and operate under a presumption that favors the
continuation of the parent-child relationship. While limiting
mandatory reporting only to professionals could help reduce the
number of investigations, as CAPTA intended but failed to do,"
statutes need to provide more guidance to help control discretion.
As parenting practices have shifted to become increasingly protective,
courts and social service agencies have also become more assertive
about enforcing child abuse and neglect laws. This trend leaves the
courts with broad discretion in deciding whether to seek and enforce
legal action against parents."1 ' As a consequence, referrals to child
welfare agencies are more likely to be investigated than they were in
the past despite CAPTA's attempt to curtail over-reporting cases of
145. Id.
146. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment substantively provides heightened protection against government interference
with parents' fundamental right and liberty interest in raising children, which is "perhaps
[one of] the oldest of [such] interests recognized by [the Supreme Court]").
147. See Hafemeister, supra note 60, at 853, 864 ("By 1977, twenty states had passed
legislation that mandated that 'any person' who suspects child abuse file a report,"
and, as of 2010, "forty-six states and the District of Columbia have established
penalties for mandated reporters failing to report child abuse.").
148. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310(A) (2010 & Supp. 2014) (listing a wide range of
occupations required to report due to professional duty).
149. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-705 (a) (1) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2015).
150. See infra note 152 (detailing CAPTA provisions on reporting and the
continued challenges of excessive reporting and investigation).
151. See Hafemeister, supra note 60, at 823-24, 842, 878, 881 (detailing the history
and statistics of child abuse reporting in the United States and the vagueness as to
how child abuse and neglect are defined in U.S. law, allowing broad discretion in
determining whether a parent may retain custody); supra note 125 and
accompanying text (employing language that does not provide clear guidance on
how to properly exercise discretionary enforcement).
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suspected child abuse and neglect,15 1 inevitably harming children
who do not require intervention,"' as in the Meitiv and Harrell cases.
Parents who employ free-range parenting techniques are more
likely to be the targets of child abuse and neglect enforcement than
traditional child abusers (e.g., parents who abuse their children in
private) because their children are often seen in public and, as
previously discussed, state and federal law encourage over-reporting
instances of suspected child neglect. 4  Because typical "indicators
[of neglect] are not as clear as in direct abuse cases,"" it is likely that
there will be many more cases involving parents that either (1) allow
their children to remain unsupervised in public as a lesson in
independence, or (2) are forced to leave their children unsupervised
in public because of a lack of resources to secure child care.'
E. The Wide-Reaching Effects of Child Neglect Statutes and the Best Interest
of the Child Standard
Child neglect statutes and the best interest of the child standard
have discriminated against disadvantaged families.'"' Race, class, and
152. CAPTA was amended in 1996. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, 110 Stat. 3063. In the amendment,
Congress sought, in part, to address the growing number of reports of
unsubstantiated child neglect by modifying federal and state programs that aimed to
single out clear instances of child abuse and neglect. Id. §§ 102(f), 104(3) (D)-(F),
105(a) (1) (E). However, the problem of over-reporting and unsubstantiated
investigations remains many years later. See CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 63, at
x-xii, 20 (noting that approximately two-thirds of referrals to child welfare services
are investigated, four-fifths result in a finding of no maltreatment, and almost sixty
percent are unsubstantiated or intentionally false); see also Hafemeister, supra note
60, at 883 (showing the increase in removals from 206,000 in 2003 to 267,000 in
2008); supra notes 74-93 and accompanying text (highlighting the Skenazy, Meitiv,
and Harrell cases as examples of unsubstantiated investigations).
153. Cf Wald, supra note 69, at 1001 (suggesting that vague child neglect laws
increase intervention decisions that result in harm to the child).
154. See Pimentel, supra note 52, at 266-67 (arguing that the confluence of state
law, which either encourages or requires mandatory reporting of child
endangerment, and federal law, which provides financial incentives to states providing
immunity to reporters of child abuse, will allow more free-range parents to be
criminalized because their children are visible within the community, "[w]hile
stereotypical child abuse takes place behind closed doors and often goes undetected").
155. Id. at 247.
156. See id. at 266-67 (suggesting that laws incentivizing over-reporting coupled
with the public nature of free-range parenting will result in more investigations); see also
supra Section IA5 (describing the Meitiv and Harrell cases and the legal system's response).
157. See Wald, supra note 69, at 998 ("[S]ocial work agencies apply middle-class
standards to poor and minority parents and attempt to change their lifestyles to meet
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gender biases influence intervention decisions15 8 where parents
either do not have a choice in supervising their child"' or make a
conscious moral decision with the child's best interests in mind.1 *
Judges are, at times, reluctant to award custody in cases that do not
reflect their personal values."6 ' Furthermore, if judges ultimately
make determinations about the moral fitness of a custodian based on
the judge's own biases, judges could reach varying determinations,
further exacerbating inconsistent removal determinations. Judges
ultimately are "not particularly well-equipped to decide moral
issues."l62 As a result, the best interest of the child standard harms
disadvantaged families.
Arguably, the vagueness of the best interest of the child standard
and removal statutes encourages discrimination against lower income
families and those with disabilities because the focus tends to be on
the parents 6 s and not the best interest of the child.'" Child neglect
statutes "[r]arely . .. require any showing of actual harm to the child;
in fact, [they] do not even specify the types of harm that are of
concern."' To illustrate, Rodriguez v. Dumpson'* involved a blind
middle-class norms ... [and] threaten to remove children or withhold desired
services, such as day-care, in order to force parental compliance with the worker's
concepts of proper childrearing.").
158. Id. (observing that social work agencies often measure poor and minority
parents by middle-class standards); see Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody,
Discretion, and Sexual Orientation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 857-58, 881 (1997) (describing
the prejudices courts have traditionally imposed on same-sex couples and the
unfounded biases regarding the harm same-sex relationships cause young children).
159. See supra Section I.A.5 (describing Debra Harrell's legal battle, which began
when Harrell let her nine-year-old daughter play unattended in a park near Harrell's
workplace because Harrell could not afford child care).
160. See In reYve S., 819 A.2d 1030, 1040, 1042 (Md. 2003) (emphasizing that the
protections guaranteed to parents in raising children are contingent on satisfying the
best interest of the child standard, which "embraces a strong presumption that the
child's best interests are served by maintaining parental rights").
161. Cf Strasser, supra note 158, at 857-58, 861 (suggesting that judges are
reluctant to award custody in cases involving moral issues, such as in the context of
parental fitness of same-sex couples, perhaps because judges are wary of making a
determination of fitness based on their own conceptions of morality).
162. Id. at 861.
163. See, e.g., Covert, supra note 84 (detailing how Debra Harrell's daughter was
taken into protective custody and Harrell lost her job due to inability to afford
childcare during the summer); Benfer, supra note 12, at 320-24 (describing the various
ways in which parents with disabilities are treated unfairly by the court system).
164. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
165. See Wald, supra note 69, at 1000-01.
166. 52 A.D.2d 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
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mother who placed her newborn son in foster care because of marital
difficulties.' 67 The lower court dismissed the custody petition because
there would be considerable risk in allowing a blind mother, who
required assistance of others, to care for her son.'" When Ms.
Rodriguez sought to regain custody, a family court dismissed her
appeal because, in its view, her blindness prevented her from
providing adequate care for her son.'69 After attempting to regain
custody for nine months, Ms. Rodriguez brought an action in state
court, and the state court reversed her dismissal and remanded the
case with instructions to return her son.1 70
Child neglect statutes and the best interest of the child standard
are further implicated in the context of unattended children. The
South Carolina child neglect statute involved in the Harrell case'
criminalizes parents who leave a child at "unreasonable risk of harm
affecting the child's life, physical health, safety, or mental well-being
without removal.""' However, the statute does not specify any
circumstances as to when a child can be left alone, which allows law
enforcement officials to decide whether the parent's decision was
informed, criminal, or merely irresponsible.'7 ' Therefore, the South
Carolina statute gives law enforcement officials broad discretion to
determine the best interests of the child. This broad discretion can
be problematic, as was seen in Ms. Rodriguez's custody battle,
because it does not always invite law enforcement officials to consider
the specific circumstances influencing a parent's child-rearing decisions.
The child welfare system, influenced by the permeation of
overprotective norms into inadequate legal standards, presumes
neglect for many parents."' A presumption of guilt may be
167. Id. at 301.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 300-01.
170. Id. at 303.
171. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
172. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1660(A) (2010).
173. See, e.g., id. § 63-7-1660(B) (1) (requiring that a petition for removal include a
detailed description of the facts pertaining to why the child is subject to an
"unreasonable risk of harm," but not delineating any guidelines as to when such
harm might occur).
174. See Candace Smith & Lauren Effron, Free Range' Parents Found Responsible for
Child Neglect After Allowing Kids to Walk Home Alone, ABC NEws (Mar. 3, 2015, 5:05
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/free-range-parents-found-responsible-child-
neglect-allowing/story?id=29363859 (stating that the second incident involving the
Meitivs culminated in a finding of unsubstantiated child neglect despite the absence
of harm to the children).
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appropriate in some cases of clear abuse or neglect because society
has condemned such behavior.17 ' However, declaring a parenting
practice neglectful simply because it does not comport with a popular
standard is unjustifiable absent clear evidence of harm or imminent
risk of harm to the child.1 7 6
III. APPLYING A TORTS STANDARD IN CHILD NEGLECT EVALUATIONS
Although child neglect statutes limit cases to where a child is at
"serious" or "substantial,"1 7 ' risk of harm, the statutes fail to
consider the foreseeable likelihood of such harm occurring.' 79 As
previously discussed, the lack of an adequate federal definition"so and
confusion among the states as to what constitutes child abuse or neglect
has led to diverging interpretations among the courts' and has
encouraged intervention on the basis of subjective judgments of parental
conduct rather than actual harm or the likelihood of harm to the child. 2
175. See In re Philip M., 624 N.E.2d 168, 168, 172-73 (N.Y. 1993) (stating that New
York's child neglect statute allows a finding of abuse in cases where the child sustains
an injury that would not occur absent acts or omissions of the child's caretaker; in
this case, two children, ages eight and five, contracted a sexually transmitted disease);
see also Wald, supra note 69, at 1031 ("[W]here intervention is premised on physical abuse,
sexual abuse, or parental behavior causing emotional damage, rarely can the parents'
actions be accepted as an alternative means of promoting the child's best interest.").
176. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN § 63-7-1660(A) (criminalizing parents who leave a child
at "unreasonable risk of harm").
177. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
178. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 5-701(b) (1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2015).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g (2006); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 5-701. But see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
(AM. LAw INST. 2010) (noting several factors regarding conduct lacking reasonable
care, including the "foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result in
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of
precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm").
180. See supra Sections I.A.3, II.D (arguing that federal legislation that was
intended to isolate cases and clarify the definition of child abuse and neglect has in
fact increased findings of neglect).
181. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 5-323(e) (1) (adopting a clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard in child neglect determinations); Ghosh v. Ill. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs., No. 1-13-1099, 2014 WL 2730725, at *10 (Ill. App. Ct. June
13, 2014) (holding that a child's age is not dispositive for a finding of neglect);
Comm'r of Admin. for Children's Servs. v. Tanya W., 269 A.D.2d 394, 395 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000) (observing that a preponderance of the evidence is needed to support a
finding of child neglect); In re Zeiser, 728 N.E.2d 10, 11, 17-18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)
(holding parents negligent per se for leaving children ages six and eight at home alone,
despite evidence that the children were very mature and responsible for their ages).
182. See Wald, supra note 69, at 1000-01 (explaining that the way in which the
statutes are phrased do not adequately account for the best interests of the child).
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As the law currently stands, it is difficult to separate a parental
decision from an activity a child is engaging in because parental
choice is being evaluated rather than the likelihood of risk of the
child's activity. It could be argued that the absence of precision in
defining neglect is necessary and that broad child neglect statutes
recognize that neglectful behavior varies, which allows judges to
examine each case more effectively.' But if child abuse and neglect
statutes are not revised to acknowledge the principle that parents
have the fundamental right to raise their children without undue
interference1 84 and to incorporate actual or foreseeable harm to
children based on their activities, the law will continue to be applied
inconsistently. Consequently, parents will be subject to state
intervention when they let their children out in public unsupervised,
whether by choice or not. 185
Ultimately, child neglect statutes should be designed to protect
children, not to evaluate parents' child-rearing philosophies. A more
objective assessment of imminent harm to the child and its
association with risk should be adopted, which will account for
parenting preferences that do not conform to the current helicopter
parenting standard. The negligence and causation standards of care
in tort law are instructive in developing this standard to more
effectively guide enforcement of child abuse and neglect laws.
Negligence in tort law, for example, is an objective standard, defined
as "conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."'8 A negligent
act is one performed without the care a reasonable person in the
same position "would recognize as necessary to prevent the act from
creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another,""' and an
individual may be found liable to another for negligence if his or her
"conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm."' If states
183. See id. at 1001 (noting that the imposition of broad child neglect statutes
recognizes the fact that neglectful behavior varies dramatically, but that such a broad
definition is undesirable because vague laws increase the likelihood that intervention
will occur in cases in which intervention may cause harm to the child).
184. See supra Section IA.1 (arguing that constitutional protections have been
recognized and provide the infrastructure to implement a fairer standard that evaluates
each case on the merits, and not on personal opinions of proper parenting).
185. See supra Section I.A.5 (describing some of the different scenarios in which
parents have let their children engage in unsupervised activities in public and have
received criticism for their actions).
186. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OFTORTs § 282 (AM. LAwINsT. 1965) (emphasis added).
187. Id. § 298.
188. Id. § 431(a) (emphasis added).
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adopt the objective analyses outlined in tort law, including the
unreasonable risk of harm language, states will be able to more
appropriately recognize the parent-child relationship and evaluate
parental decisions.
A. The Jurisdictional Approach
A few jurisdictions have incorporated some form of tort doctrine
into their child neglect statutes.' But these forms are based on the
res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself') 9 0 framework, which
presumes negligence.' 91 Res ipsa loquitur statutory frameworks tend
to work against the parents who allow their children to remain
unsupervised in public because child neglect law enforcement,
through the discretion of law enforcement officials, has criminalized
parents who do not conform to overprotective norms. 9
Furthermore, res ipsa loquitur frameworks in parental termination
statutes directly counter the fundamental right parents have in caring
for, and maintaining custody and control of, their children,' and the
presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests. 9
In the case of parents who believe developing childhood
independence is important, there is no quantitative injury-actual or
reasonably perceived-caused by leaving a child unsupervised in
reasonable proximity to his or her parents. However, a finding of
unsubstantiated neglect is analogous to a presumption of neglect,
and once a prima facie case is established, parents are unlikely to
189. See In re Philip M., 624 N.E.2d 168, 172 (N.Y. 1993) (stating that New York
child abuse and neglect statute, McKinney's Family Court Act § 1046, was modeled
after the res ipsa loquitur doctrine).
190. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 853 (2010 & Supp. 2015).
191. See Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch.) 300 (indicating that a
presumption of negligence, res ipsa loquitur, can arise from an accident where the
mere fact that the accident happened is evidence of negligence).
192. See Levine, supra note 11, at 593-95 (discussing several cases involving the
New York statute and how such statutes "mirror society's conception of parental
obligations, and ... based on socially acceptable," but not necessarily legally
acceptable, "parenting methods"); see also supra Sections L.A-B (describing the
background and results of the Meitiv and Harrell cases).
193. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-67 (2000) (explaining that this
parental fundamental right is protected under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
194. See Dalrymple, supra note 65, at 144 (stating that some state statutes require courts
to find parental unfitness before even considering the best interests of the child).
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overcome the presumption.' 5 Indeed, a finding of abuse or neglect
"constitutes a permanent, and significant, stigma ... [that] might
indirectly affect [a parent's] status in potential future proceedings."' 6
In contrast to implementing child neglect statutes under a
presumption of neglect, some courts have adopted a more
comprehensive approach to enforcement. For example, in Nicholson
v. Scoppetta,`' the New York Court of Appeals set forth principles to
guide both child welfare agencies and the courts in determining a
more useful and objective standard of care in child neglect and abuse
cases.'98 The court noted that, under New York law, "neglect" should
require a parent's failure in exercising a "'minimum degree of
care' . . . not maximum, not best, not ideal-and the failure [to
supervise] must be actual, not threatened."'99 Additionally, "courts
must evaluate parental behavior objectively," according to a
reasonable person standard that takes into account the "special
vulnerabilities of the child" and the relevant facts of each case.200 A
standard that recognizes a "minimum degree of care" accounts for
diverging parenting philosophies and places the burden on the state
to apply the law to the facts of the case. A standard that expands on
this notion by balancing a probability assessment with additional
factors will allow states to more uniformly interpret child abuse and
neglect laws and provide a more clear and objective standard in
evaluating parents' behavior.
B. Incorporating Heightened Standards-Three Steps
Parents should be liable for supervising their children and the
consequences resulting from their choices made as parents; after all,
they are ultimately responsible for their children's welfare and are in
the best position to evaluate their children's capabilities. Indeed,
parents have a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent a
known injury from occurring, the breach of which could constitute
195. See Levine, supra note 11, at 594-95 (explaining that the presumption in res
ipsa loquitur cases is hard to rebut in part because the cases that lend themselves to
application of the doctrine are usually extreme).
196. Id. at 616 (quoting Inrw H. Children, 548 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587 (App. Div. 1989)).
197. 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004).
198. Id. at 846-47.
199. Id. at 846.
200. Id.
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negligence."' The rationale underlying particularized foreseeability
is that a failure to warn would likely result in an injury. 20 2 But such
foreseeability does not necessarily impose a duty because what one parent
might deem neglectfulos might be reasonable parenting for another.204
Parents are not expected to have a heightened reason to know that
their child may be injured at any moment,20o but they should be held
liable if they are aware of, but ignore, an injury that might reasonably
occur after leaving a child unattended. For example, the Ohio Court
of Appeals, in observing that there is always a possibility of injury
when a child walks home alone, found that those responsible for
supervising a child who was beaten by a classmate on his way home
could not "foresee the unforeseeable," and, rather, the violent nature
of the classmate was the direct and proximate cause of injury.20 ' The
court observed that lack of supervision could only be described as a
remote cause of the injury, "if any, requiring ... conjecture to sustain
any connection between the absence and injury" necessary for a
finding of neglect.20' Because insulating a child from one risk can
expose them to another,20 s a legal standard that acknowledges the
201. J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 930, 935 (N.J. 1998) (holding that a person has a
duty to prevent an injury when he or she has actual knowledge or a reason to know
that an injury will result from a crime).
202. Id. at 930.
203. In the Meitiv case, a bystander reported the unattended children to the
police for the first incident on October 27, 2014. Metcalf, supra note 77.
204. The Meitivs allowed their children to play outside and walk a short distance
home in a familiar area. See Smith & Effron, supra note 174. The Meitivs stand by
their parenting style and have taken legal action against Maryland CPS and the
Montgomery County Police. See Metcalf, supra note 77. They are being represented
by the Washington D.C. law firm Wiley Rein on a pro bono basis. Id.
205. See R.H. v. Mischenko, No. L-2373-06, 2011 WL 2320844, at *4--5 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. June 3, 2011) (per curiam) (finding that the parents in this case did not
have a duty to know that their child may be assaulted by a third party when measured
against the standard of "particularized foreseeability" adopted in JS., 714 A.2d at
935); Champion v. Dunfee, 939 A.2d 825, 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)
(holding that an individual has no duty to control the conduct of a third party to
prevent harm to another).
206. Finkenbine v. Hengsteler, No. 17-84-2, 1985 WL 7409, at *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 1985) (quoting Person v. Gum, 455 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)).
207. Id. at *3; see also Person, 455 N.E.2d at 714, 716 (refusing to hold an
elementary school teacher liable for injuries a child sustained when he was struck by
a car while walking home from school because the teacher's conduct was not the
proximate cause of the child's injuries).
208. See Pimentel, supra note 52, at 277 ("It will usually be impossible for parents
to insulate their children entirely from risks of serious harm."); see also Finkenbine,
1985 WL 7409, at *3 (observing that there is always the possibility of danger and
injury when a child is walking unsupervised (citing Person, 455 N.E.2d at 716)).
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foreseeable likelihood of risk would allow parents and law
enforcement officials to more effectively exercise their discretion.20 9
Granted, a revision of child neglect statutes will create a more rigid
standard and give less discretion to law enforcement officials, but the
law should account for, and accommodate, different parenting styles.
A statute is not "unconstitutionally vague" when "individuals of
ordinary intelligence" can understand what conduct the statute
proscribes and prohibits. 210 However, statutes are currently written
abstractly and protect against only the most egregious conduct.'
Bright line laws proscribing acceptable conduct are helpful, but those
setting acceptable limits on activities children may engage in do not
account for varying degrees of child maturity and parenting styles. 212
To effectuate a more objective standard allowing for more uniform
law enforcement, states should first enforce their statutes under a
hybrid foreseeability and economic analysis standard. This standard
should then be analyzed along with guidelines to streamline
discretionary enforcement of child neglect statutes as well as the best
interest of the child standard, while also acknowledging that parents
should enjoy the fundamental right to raise their children without
undue interference.
1. Employing economic analyses in reevaluating child neglect statutes
A parent should certainly be held liable for unreasonable actual or
perceived harm to his or her child. Although many statutes define
child neglect in terms of "imminent" or "substantial" risk of harm, they
209. Cf Pimentel, supra note 52, at 277-80 (incorporating "risk management" into
legal standards will allow "room to consider and respect the proper role and exercise
of parental discretion").
210. State v. Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121, 122 (Ind. 1985).
211. See, e.g., Demontigneyv. State, 593 N.E.2d 1270, 1271-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(declining to hold the Indiana child neglect statute unconstitutionally vague because
"people of ordinary intelligence" would be able to determine that parents, who
chained their young child to a bed for long periods of time, allowing him to defecate
and urinate on himself without food or water, clearly "abandon[ed] or cruelly
confin [ed their child]").
212. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 5-701(e), (s) (1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp.
2015) (setting age limits for when a child can be left unattended in Maryland);
Pimentel, supra note 123, at 992 (providing hypotheticals that demonstrate the
varying degrees of maturity in children); see also State v. Massey, 715 N.E.2d 235, 238-
39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (involving a mother who was found to be merely
imprudent, and not neglectful, when she left her two-and-a-half-year-old daughter in
the bathtub and returned approximately thirty seconds to four minutes later to find
her unresponsive, which, in the court's view, implicated only speculative risks to the
child and did not create a substantially foreseeable risk of harm to a child of her age).
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do not specify whether such risks are reasonably perceived.21 ' They
simply state that a parent may be found neglectful for placing their child
in harm's way.2 M Even statutes that specify risks as "substantial" or
"imminent" do not define what constitutes substantial or imminent
harm. Such language, compounded by a standard of care that has
shifted from allowing children more autonomy to overprotection, has
discriminated against some families who are at the mercy of a law
enforcement official's definition of "substantial" or "imminent.""'
Applying an economic analysis to child neglect determinations will
help control judicial discretion in interpreting the law. The courts,
when determining whether a risk of harm is foreseeable, balance the
probability of harm against the cost of prevention and social utility of
an act.' The holding in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v.
Krayenbuhl is particularly helpful in reevaluating child welfare statutes
under this analysis. The court in Krayenbuhl recognized that while
there were several risks associated with the use of dangerous
machinery, the public benefit of using these machines far outweighed
the dangers they posed because the machines are necessary for
commerce and other business-related purposes. 18  Such devices
should be used in the least restrictive manner until the dangers of
using them outweigh the benefits. To minimize risk, such as loss of
life or limb, the railroad should impose restrictions on the most
efficient use of the turntable by ensuring it was locked when not in
use. 2 " Accordingly, "the interference with the proper use of the
turntable occasioned by the use of such [a] lock is so slight that it is
213. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-701(e), (s)(1)-(2) (outlining the Maryland
child neglect statute that applied to the Meitiv case); see supra note 58 (listing the
statutes of several states that follow CAPTA's definition of child neglect); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(16), (18) (b) (3) (2013) (outlining a child neglect statute
that does not specify the minimum culpability for neglect).
214. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (explaining how some states
have either repealed or modified the tests used under those statutes).
215. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 5-701(s) (1)-(2) (stating that a finding of
neglect requires a finding of "substantial risk," but does not define what constitutes a
"substantial risk of harm" or a "substantial risk of mental injury"); see also supra notes
54-56 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part II (outlining the shift to overprotection, its relation to statutory
enforcement, and its effect on families from different socioeconomic backgrounds).
217. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. 880, 881-82
(Neb. 1902) (employing an economic analysis to determine liability for a railroad
company after a turntable was left unlocked and severed a boy's foot).
218. Id. at 882-83.
219. Id.
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outweighed by the danger to be anticipated from an omission to use
it; therefore the public good.. . demands the use of the lock."22 0
There are a variety of laws in the United States requiring certain
safety measures because the public overwhelmingly believes there is
foreseeable or unreasonable harm in the absence of such measures.
For example, as of November 2015, nineteen states have laws
prohibiting parents from leaving their children unattended in cars,
while fifteen others proposed laws that would make it illegal to do
so 2; twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have mandatory
bicycle helmet laws for children below a certain age, generally under
sixteen2 22 ; and all states have adopted some form of mandatory seat
belt22 ' and child passenger seat laws. 224  These and similar laws 225
reflect the public's perception that the likelihood of harm
anticipated from using proper restraints and helmets is very slight,226
or at least significantly reduced, compared to the danger anticipated
from not using them.2 2 ' Likewise, many families choose to live in
coastal flood zones or earthquake-prone areas despite the chance of
220. Id.
221. Children Left Unattended in Vehicle Laws by State, KIDSANDCARS.ORG,
http://www.kidsandcars.org/state-laws.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
222. Helmet Laws, GOvERNORs HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS'N,
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/helmet-1aws.html (last updated Nov. 2015).
223. See Seat Belt Laws, GovERNoRs HIGHWAY SAFETY Ass'N,
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/1aws/seatbelt_1aws.html (last updated Nov.
2015) (listing the seat belt laws of every state, the minimum covered age, and the
penalty for first time offenders).
224. See id. (listing the child restraint laws for every state, which includes the age
and weight when a rear-facing seat is required, the ages and weight where an adult
seat belt is permissible, and the penalty for first time offenders).
225. Cf Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 669 A.2d 1378, 1381 (N.J. 1996) (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting) (per curiam) (arguing that the plaintiff was liable for injuries sustained
when he exited his car on the side of a highway and ran into traffic to retrieve a spare
tire assembly that fell off because the plaintiff created a clearly dangerous condition,
and stating that the state highway regulations prohibiting such behavior is "proof
that society has concluded that such actions are dangerous, unreasonable and,
therefore, prohibited").
226. For example, it may be more difficult to remove a child from a booster seat
or infant base in an emergency. See Pimentel, supra note 52, at 283-84 (emphasizing
that despite risks associated with child restraint laws, "the scientific consensus is that
risks associated with unbuckled children are far greater than the costs and risks
associated with putting them in approved safety restraints").
227. See Child Safety, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, http://www.iihs.org/iihs/
topics/t/child-safety/fatalityfacts/child-safety (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (observing
that, as a result of mandatory child restraint laws, the rate of automobile crash deaths
per million children younger than thirteen has decreased by seventy-eight percent-
from 3643 to 939-between 1975 and 2013).
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danger to their homes and families. They believe that the anticipated
danger is remote in comparison to the reward, such as superior
educational or employment opportunities, from living in these areas.
Parents would not argue that child restraint laws overreach because
they are aware of the serious risks associated with automobile use,
which is substantiated by data showing the reduction in the number
of automobile-related deaths in the past several decades." An
economic analysis demonstrates that the public overwhelmingly
perceives the absence of helmet and seat belt laws to be an
unreasonable risk because the harm likely to result from using them
is much less than the danger anticipated from not using them,
thereby demonstrating their social utility. Similarly, it is unlikely
someone would question a judgment call about relocating based on
favorable opportunities despite an increased risk of harm. Economic
analysis of negligence has been applied in various areas to determine
the utility of a behavior,229 which can be extended to child neglect
determinations to show whether the act a child is engaging in has a
higher social utility than the harm it poses.
Although parenting views have shifted dramatically, every family
approaches child supervision differently. Using an economic analysis
for questionable activities where neglect may be difficult to quantify
will provide a more objective foundation in assessing child neglect
laws, particularly those that discriminate against parents who allow
their children to remain unsupervised in public. For example, the
Meitivs initially only allowed their children to play in their yard
unsupervised.2" 0 When the Meitiv children proved they could play
alone responsibly, their parents allowed them walk unsupervised for
very short distances.231 Mr. and Mrs. Meitiv assessed their children's
capabilities and allowed them to walk to and from the local library
and school bus stop only when they became sufficiently familiar with
the neighborhood and proved capable of doing so. 23 2 Free-range
228. Id.
229. For an analogous framework applied to a negligence case in tort, see supra
notes 98-102, 220 and accompanying text (analyzing the social utility of keeping a
dangerous railroad contraption locked so it poses a significantly reduced threat).
230. See Peter Gray, Meet Danielle Meitiv: Fighting for Her Kids' Rights, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Apr. 11, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/freedom-
learn/201504/meet-danielle-meitiv-fighting-her-kids-rights.
231. Id.; see also Wallace, supra note 79 (emphasizing that the children previously
walked and played alone in closer proximity to their home prior to the second incident).
232. See Gray, supra note 230 (stating that the Meitivs, after an interview involving
the second incident where the children were detained by Montgomery County,
Maryland police, felt their children were ready to walk home from the nearby park).
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parents in particular will be helped by an economic analysis of
negligence because it takes into account the social utility of the act in
which the child is engaging, and the courts are likely to agree that
allowing children to remain unsupervised at times can benefit
psychological and physical health. While an economic analysis is
helpful in quantifying difficult choices that some parents make, other
indicators are both necessary and helpful in ascertaining the likelihood
of a "substantial" or "imminent" injury in cases where parents do not
have a choice but to allow their children to remain unsupervised, as in
the Harrell case. At this point, the operative question becomes whether
that risk of harm is substantially foreseeable or unreasonable.
2. Analyzing the foreseeability or likelihood of resulting harm
When a court cannot clearly determine the level of culpability by
employing an economic analysis in evaluating suspected abuse or
neglect, it should consider the foreseeability or likelihood of harm
resulting from the action the child is engaging in. Child abuse and
neglect statutes employ vague language because there are infinite
ways for negligence to manifest. However, as previously discussed,
child neglect statutes that employ vague language, though stating a
transformative standard of care, have caused inconsistent removal
determinations.23 8 After carefully weighing the facts and
circumstances of each case, it should not be particularly difficult to
determine the foreseeability of an injury, or whether an injury is
substantially connected to a negligent act. If a risk that is reasonably
perceived-such as allowing children to play in the back of a car
unrestrained or walking in a dangerous neighborhood at night
unsupervised-manifests in injury, a parent may be found guilty of
abuse or neglect.234  But parents should not be liable for the
unforeseen consequences of their parental discretion, particularly
those that do not cause injury and have social utility because they
intend to instill a sense of independence, self-reliance, and maturity
in children, and ultimately provide them with a better life.2 11 If
negligence was found in similar cases without a substantial likelihood
233. See supra Parts I-II (cataloguing various state-level child neglect statutes and
explaining their inconsistent application).
234. However, one commentator argues that even an unreasonable parenting
decision should not warrant removal because "[p]arents are not perfect and will
make occasional mistakes, missteps, or omissions, even negligent ones." Pimentel,
supra note 52, at 284.
235. See supra Section I.A.5 (describing the circumstances surrounding the arrest
of Debra Harrell, who was working to support her daughter).
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of harm, parents could be negligent "for any and all consequences,
however novel or extraordinary. "236
Data has shown that children are much safer today than they were
twenty years ago 2 37 and that fears reinforcing overprotective standards
are largely misguided."3 Some have even suggested that helicopter
parenting norms can increase the risk of various health-related
issues,3 which children may carry into adulthood.24 o If there is
236. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
237. See DAVID FINKELHOR & RICHARD ORMROD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMES AGAINST JUVENILES 3 (2000) (indicating that juveniles
make up a small percentage of victimization rates in the United States); Christopher
Ingraham, There's Never Been a Safer Time to Be a Kid in America, WASH. POST (Apr. 14,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/14/theres-
never-been-a-safer-time-to-be-a-kid-in-america (analyzing the sharp decline in child-
related mortality statistics between 1990 and 2012, which includes a forty percent
decline in reports of missing children and a more than a sixty-six percent drop in
child pedestrians struck and killed by cars); see also CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note
63, at ii (stating that between 2009 and 2013, child victimization rates dropped from
9.3 to 9.1 per 1000 children, which accounts for approximately 23,000 fewer victims).
238. See Pimentel, supra note 52, at 250-51 (asserting that, although car accidents
are by far the most serious risk to children, parents' overprotection stems from
misguided fears of stranger abduction, which constitutes a very remote threat to
children); see also FINKELHOR & ORMROD, supra note 237, at 7 (stating that eighty
percent of perpetrators against juveniles are known to the victim, and "[d]espite the
stereotypes about stranger molesters and rapists, sex offenses are the crimes least
likely to involve strangers as perpetrators"); Sam Wright, Free-Range Parents and the
Law, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 21, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/04/
free-range-parents-and-the-law (suggesting that allowing a child to walk home from a
playground may be "less of a threat to that child's safety than the everyday act of
buckling . .. into a car"); Crime in the United States 2012, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/tableicrimeinthe-united-states_by_volum
e_and-rate-per100000inhabitants_1993-2012.xls (reporting that between 1993
and 2012, violent crime declined from a rate of 747.1 per 100,000 inhabitants to 386.9
per 100,000 inhabitants; murder and non-negligent manslaughter from 9.5 to 4.7;
forcible rape 41.1 to 26.9; robbery 256 to 112.9; and aggravated assault 440.5 to 242.3).
239. See, e.g., Pimentel, supra note 52, at 255 (contending that close supervision of
a child's environment can discourage a child from developing autonomy and self-
confidence, exacerbate childhood obesity because children spend the majority of
their time indoors in sedentary activity, and hinder the development of natural
immunities due to lack of exposure to other children and the outdoors); Pimentel,
supra note 123, at 958 (averring that helicopter parents who restrain children from
playing outdoors also "impair[s] the child's ability to develop independence,
responsibility, and self-reliance"); see also CHERYL D. FRYAR ET AL., PREVALENCE OF
OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY AMONG CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 1 (2014) (stating that
16.9% of children and adolescents aged two to nineteen are obese, and 14.9% are
overweight, while the percentages for these same groups in the early 1970's were
10.2% and 5.2%, respectively); Brody, supra note 75 (linking the significant rise in
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neither an actual injury nor one that is reasonably foreseeable as a
result of similar actions, there can be no finding of neglect if other
risk factors are not present. Terms such as "substantial," and phrases
like "endangers the life" have been incorporated into many states'
child neglect statutes "' and have resulted in rulings of parental
neglect in cases where an injury is only remotely foreseeable. 142 As a
result, it appears these terms and phrases have been interpreted over
the years to mean "any egregious harm that can occur, even if
unlikely," which is why Ms. Harrell in South Carolina, the Meitivs in
Maryland, and other parents who, whether by choice or not, allow
their children to be unsupervised, have been held civilly and
criminally liable for child neglect.243 The result is the perpetuation of
the helicopter parenting standard and reinforcement of largely
unfounded fears of danger to children. 2" Furthermore, child
neglect statutes neither require any showing of harm to the child nor
specify the foreseeability of harm likely to occur, tend to look at the
parents exclusively, and do not emphasize the child's behavior.15
In Palsgraf Justice Cardozo held that negligence is based on the
foreseeability of harm, where a more foreseeable risk imports a
heightened duty to prevent that risk from manifesting.246 Applying
Justice Cardozo's analysis to the Meitiv case, for example, would yield
more just results because there was no foreseeable "substantial risk of
harm"2 " to the children walking home from a park midday in a well-
populated neighborhood after their parents determined they were
childhood depression, anxiety disorders, and Type 2 diabetes over the past five
decades to the decline in outdoor play among children).
240. See Bernstein & Triger, supra note 4, at 1260 (noting that obesity in children,
which has tripled between 1980 and 2004, is a key precursor to adulthood obesity).
241. See supra note 58 (outlining the statutes of several states that use a variation of
the word "substantial" or provide even less emphasis in defining child neglect).
242. See supra Section I.A.5 (describing the Meitiv and Harrell cases).
243. See supra Section I.A.5 (describing the various contexts in which a parent can
be held liable for child neglect).
244. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (asserting that despite the
perception of stranger abduction as a "substantial risk" to children, it is not
reasonably likely to occur).
245. See Wald, supra note 69, at 1000-01 (summarizing the current state standards
for intervention and commenting that they define neglect in terms of parental
conduct and seldom require a showing of harm to the child); supra note 12 and
accompanying text (discussing Rodriguez v. Dumpson, 52 A.D.2d 299 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976), in which a family court dismissed the plaintiffs appeal because, in its view, her
blindness prevented her from providing adequate care for her son).
246. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928).
247. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 5-701 (s) (1) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2015).
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capable of doing so. 2 11 Ms. Harrell, who, unlike the Meitivs, had no
choice but to leave her daughter unsupervised, diminished any
foreseeable harm by choosing a park in close proximity and
providing her daughter with a cell phone to use in the event of an
emergency. 249 In quantifying neglectful behavior, a foreseeability
analysis takes the economic analysis approach a step further by
ascertaining the likelihood of an injury in cases where children are
unsupervised in public.
i. Intervening events serving as superseding causes
An argument can be made that a parent should be held
accountable for their child's actions, as children are held to a lower
standard of care unless they are engaging in an inherently dangerous
activity.so But if the child was not engaging in an activity that society
has not deemed to be unreasonably dangerous, or if the child was
injured by a third party, parents should not be held unequivocally
accountable for judgments that do not give rise to foreseeable harm.
In tort law, an intervening event that is unrelated to a parenting
decision will serve as a superseding cause of injury and break the
chain of causation that would normally permit a finding of
negligence. If a child is injured as the result of a third party (e.g., hit
by a car or assaulted), the parents should not be presumed
neglectful. Law enforcement officials need to evaluate suspected
cases of neglect on a case-by-case basis and look at the actual injury to
determine whether it is a foreseeable consequence of a parenting
decision. For example, in State v. Forcum,"' a mother left her three
young children, one of whom was six years old, at home with her
sixteen-year-old drunk son while she went grocery shopping.2 2 Despite
deplorable sanitary conditions at the home, the Oregon Court of
Appeals overturned her conviction of child neglect, stating that such an
act "cannot be described as leaving her [youngest child] 'unattended' or
as a specific act likely to endanger the child's health or welfare . . .
[and the mother's] absence [did not] ... create[] any greater risks
than her presence."' In such cases, the evidence must show that a
248. Wallace, supra note 79.
249. Covert, supra note 84.
250. Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392, 393-94 (Wash. 1979) (en banc) (holding
that "the child should be held to an adult standard of care" because he was engaged in
the inherently dangerous activity of driving a snowmobile at the time of the accident).
251. 646 P.2d 1356 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
252. Id. at 1357.
253. Id. at 1358.
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parent who performs an act without recognizing an increased likelihood
that the child may be harmed was different "in an extraordinary way from
what others would have done in similar circumstances."254
If, for example, a child is walking home from a nearby park, as the
Meitiv children were, and the child is hit by a speeding car while the
children are legally crossing the road, the parents should not be held
liable for neglect or negligent supervision solely because they should
have been protecting their child. A finding of neglect in this and
similar situations would be too remote to hold a parent liable, as the
parental conduct was not a substantial factor in causing the injury.5
If on the other hand, the child was illegally crossing the street while the
same car had a green light, one might presume that a parent might be
guilty of neglect by not carefully evaluating their child's capabilities. Or if
the child is not properly restrained in the car or is not wearing a bicycle
helmet in violation of safety laws, a parent may be found neglectful.
A contextual approach that balances factors against the social
utility of the act and the foreseeability of injury is appropriate in
similar situations. Although many states reject negligent supervision
of a child altogether under the parental immunity doctrine,56 the
Restatement (Second) of Torts offers several considerations that are
important in determining whether an intervening event functions as
a superseding cause that will sever liability for negligence:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in
kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from the
actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof
appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in
view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently
of any situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other
hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to
a third person's act or to his failure to act;
254. State v. McLaughlin, 600 P.2d 474, 477 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
255. See, e.g., Phila. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Forge Co., 555 F. Supp. 519, 526
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (stating that liability for negligence "must flow from affirmative
conduct which creates or augments the risk of harm").
256. See, e.g., Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497, 501 (Wash. 2008) (en banc)
(reiterating that the parental immunity doctrine shields both natural parents and
stepparents from "ordinary" negligent supervision of a child, but not willful or
wanton misconduct).
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(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third
person which is wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the
third person to liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person
which sets the intervening force in motion. 5 7
Similar considerations would allow state legislatures to effectively
modify child neglect statutes to identify or rule out superseding
causes. The Illinois child neglect statute, for example, defines a
neglected child by setting out a list of additional factors to be
considered that can help guide law enforcement officials to more
effectively exercise their discretion." 8  Still, parents in many
jurisdictions risk the removal of their children because no specific
criteria exist to define neglect, particularly when the child has not
been injured."' Stronger statutory language will allow more effective
determinations and elucidation of individualized facts. Because there
are no clear guidelines, most jurisdictions only have examples from
trial proceedings which are so heavily tailored to the facts of each
case that they neither allow an objective assessment of neglect, nor
expound a clear standard that is applicable to all cases.2'
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (AM. LAw INST. 1965).
258. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3(1) (d) (West 2007) (incorporating
fifteen separate factors to consider in negligent supervision determinations,
including "the age of the minor; . . . [the] special needs of the minor[;] ... the
duration of time in which the minor was left[;] ... the condition and location of the
place where the minor was left[;] ... the time of day or night[;] ... the weather
conditions; ... the [proximity] of the parent or guardian[;] ... whether the minor
was given a phone number of a person or location to call in the event of an
emergency and whether the minor was capable of making an emergency call; ...
[and] the age and physical and mental capabilities of the person or persons who
provided supervision"); see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 901(18)(b)(3) (2013)
(incorporating factors that courts should consider in neglect determinations, such as
"the child's age, mental ability, physical condition, the length of the caretaker's
absence, and the context of the child's environment").
259. See, e.g., supra Sections I.A.5, II.B, II.E (providing examples of how child
neglect statutes have affected families that have not placed their child at risk of
harm); see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 901(16), (18)(b)(3) (defining neglect as a
failure "to provide necessary supervision appropriate for a child when the child is
unable to care for that child's own basic needs or safety"); IND. CODE ANN. § 3546-1-
4(a) (1)-(4) (West 2014) (stating that a parent commits neglect when that person
"knowingly or intentionally (1) places the dependent in a situation that endangers
the dependent's life or health; (2) abandons or cruelly confines the dependent; (3)
deprives the dependent of necessary support; or (4) deprives the dependent of
education as required by law").
260. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (illustrating a case where a
blind mother fought to regain custody of her son after a family court determined her
disability prevented her from providing adequate parental care).
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Consequently, the child's best interest is afforded no deference
because it is interpreted at the sole discretion of a judge, who "can
disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent. "261
Ultimately, if a parent sanctions his or her child's activity where
there is a remotely foreseeable risk of harm, it should not be seen as
an aggravating factor in neglect determinations. If the opposite is
true-the risk of harm is reasonably foreseeable or unreasonable-
the activity would serve to undermine the deference given to parents
in raising their children. Accordingly, the decision should be seen as
an aggravating factor, which should be taken into consideration with
other factors relevant to making an accurate determination.
3. Balancing economic factors and foreseeability of hann against additional factors
The courts should also consider the child's interests by applying
additional factors to further clarify a standard that weighs the social
utility of a child's activity and the foreseeable likelihood of a resulting
injury. Factors specifically relating to the child may include the
child's age, maturity level, special needs, capability of contacting
someone in the event of an emergency, proximity to parents or
siblings, familiarity with his or her surroundings, adequate clothing,
and the child's own interest in being unattended. Environmental
factors may include the time of day, crime statistics of the area,
weather conditions, geographic location, access to food and water,
and whether an injury resulted from the actions of a third party.
Factors relating to a parent may include his or her age; cognitive
capabilities; the reason the child was left unattended, whether due to
a particular parenting value, economic hardship, illness, etc., and its
effect on the parent's ability to provide adequate care for the child;
the parent's ability, financial or otherwise, to secure child care;
whether the parents allowed another person to supervise the child,
and whether that person is capable of supervising a child.
Incorporating similar factors into child neglect statues, while
carefully balancing them against the social utility of the child's activity
and the foreseeability of an injury, may reduce the number of
erroneous removals by treating all parents equally. For example, the
Meitiv children were walking in the middle of the day in a safe,
populated, and well-traveled area61 only a few minutes from home2 63
261. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
262. See Gray, supra note 230 (stating that the neighborhood the Meitiv children
were walking was "pleasant, diverse, and very safe").
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and understood where they were and where they were going.26 The
Meitiv parents are a seemingly well-educated, middle-class couple 26
that sought to promote independence and maturity in their children
by allowing them to walk short distances unsupervised, 6 6 which had
no effect on their capacity to provide adequate care for their
children.2 " Likewise, if the police inquired as to why Ms. Harrell's
daughter was playing in a park unsupervised, Ms. Harrell may not
have been jailed or lost custody of her daughter.2 *
Under this hybrid framework, discretion in child neglect
determinations will be controlled, allowing for more uniform law
enforcement and affording parents more room to comfortably
deviate from helicopter parenting norms should they choose to, all
while acknowledging and preserving the constitutional precept
protecting parents' rights to make child-rearing decisions and
affording the child's best interest proper deference.
CONCLUSION
Parenting standards today contrast with traditional notions of the
parent-child relationship, manifesting a tone that censures the
personal freedom and privacy of families and the sense of adventure
and imagination children possess.' Instead, parenting norms now
reflect an obsession with child safety and overprotection, but parents'
varied circumstances 270 create innumerable ways to properly raise
263. See Metcalf, supra note 77 (stating that police picked up the children
approximately three blocks from their home).
264. See Wallace, supra note 79 (emphasizing that the children were walking home
from a nearby playground).
265. See Gray, supra note 230 (stating that Mr. Meitiv is a "theoretical physicist and
modeler who studies evolution at the molecular level at the National Institutes of
Health," and Mrs. Meitiv is an oceanographer who works "as a freelance climate
science consultant and science writer").
266. Id. (reporting that the Meitivs were closely monitoring their children's
capabilities by initially only allowing them to play in their yard, then extending that
range to the street in front of their house, and only permitting them to walk longer
distances when they proved themselves capable of doing so).
267. See Smith & Effron, supra note 174 (observing that the Meitivs were fully
capable of caring for their children, and their parenting philosophy reflects the way
millions of adults were raised).
268. See supra Section I.A.5 (describing the Harrell case).
269. See Levs, supra note 7 (suggesting that parents who micromanage every detail
of their children's daily schedule prevent them from "go[ing] out and playling]").
270. See supra Part II (analyzing the troubling results that child neglect statutes
have had on various families where there was no actual or reasonably foreseeable
harm to the child).
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children. Although the Meitiv case is a clear example that parenting
philosophies that do not conform to overprotective norms will be
condemned, 7 1 the relevant statutes have led to discrimination against
families for decades, which has threatened, and will continue to
threaten, the bond of functional and loving families. However, the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized for nearly a century that
parents have the constitutional liberty to care for, raise, and guide their
children, and an analogous privacy interest to do so "without the undue
interference of strangers to them and to their child.""' More critically,
though, the many cases applying this principle have shown that there is a
corresponding presumption that the "natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children." 73
Child abuse and neglect law enforcement reflects the shifting trend
to helicopter parenting and the reinforcement of overprotective
norms, which has influenced the interpretation of child neglect
legislation. Because societal customs are ever-evolving, the legislature
should institute the more objective-based standard of tort law in
reevaluating child neglect statutes and provide specific guidelines as
to what constitutes child abuse or neglect to control discretion in law
enforcement. Revising child neglect statutes through the lens of tort
law would provide a more comprehensive framework for child
neglect standards, offer a fair and objective assessment of injury or
potential injury to a child," and avoid the social cost of criminalizing
parenting practices that are neither abusive nor neglectful. Although
the social utility of free-range parenting is evident, there is also social
utility y when a parent has no choice but to allow their child to
remain unsupervised. In many such cases, parents are working to
provide adequate food, clothing, and shelter so that their children may
lead a better life. Absent any actual harm to a child, the standard should
account for the utility in various child-rearing practices, the
foreseeability of harm, and any other mitigating or aggravating factors
that are helpful in making child neglect determinations.
271. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (detailing the Meitiv case and
results from an investigation by Maryland CPS).
272. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 87 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 68 (majority opinion) (quoting Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584,602 (1979)).
274. See supra Part II (arguing that tort law can help guide legislatures to redraft
child neglect statutes to recognize various parental philosophies and the deference
afforded to parents in raising their children).
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